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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In July 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit explicitly abolished the long-standing doctrine of inextricable 
intertwinement as a basis of admissibility for other bad acts evidence.1 
Other bad acts evidence is usually inadmissible, as it tends to suggest 
improper character inferences.2 However, in some instances, this type 
of evidence is intertwined with other admissible evidence in such a 
way that it helps to complete the story of the crime by filling a 
conceptual or chronological void3 or is so blended or connected that it 
incidentally involves, explains the circumstances surrounding, or tends 
to prove an element of the charged crime.4 In such circumstances, the 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Notre Dame Law School; A.B., Philosophy, June 
2007, Dartmouth College. Visiting student at Chicago-Kent College of Law during 
the 2010–2011 academic year. 
1 See United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010). 
2 See infra notes 13–25. 
 3 See, e.g., United States v. Luster, 480 F.3d 551, 556–57 (7th Cir. 2007).  
4 See, e.g., United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 760 (7th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Gougis, 432 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ojomo, 332 
D.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
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doctrine of inextricable intertwinement is invoked to admit the 
evidence.5 This doctrine’s relationship with Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b)’s prohibition against the use of other bad acts evidence has 
become increasingly confusing and problematic. The Seventh Circuit’s 
recent decisions indicate an increasing frustration with the doctrine, 
with the court believing that the doctrine has “become overused, 
vague, and quite unhelpful” and as such, “has outlived its 
usefulness.”6 In United States v. Gorman, the Seventh Circuit 
altogether abolished the doctrine in favor of the exclusive use of Rule 
404(b)7 as the basis of admissibility for other bad acts evidence.8 T
date, the Seventh Circuit is alone in this practice. However, it is th
position of this Comment that as a result of the way the doctrine has 
been expanded since its creation, the doctrine should be abolished in 
the other circuits as well. As currently applied, the doctrine poses 
significant threats to 9
o 
e 
defendants’ rights.   
                                                
  
I. CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
 
 The term “character evidence” is used to indicate any evidence 
“probative of a pertinent trait of a person’s character, such as honesty, 
temperance or peacefulness.”10 This evidence may be presented in 
either civil or criminal trials, and may be introduced in three ways:  
reputation testimony, personal opinion testimony, or by evidence of 
specific acts previously committed by the defendant.11 The most 
persuasive of these proofs is evidence of prior acts, which can be 
particularly damning in the context of prior crimes, wrongs, or 
misconducts.12 As such, the American legal system has created special 
 
5 Id. 
6 Gorman, 613 F.3d at 719. 
7 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
8 Gorman, 613 F.3d at 719.  
9 See infra notes 17–18, 229–43 and accompanying text.  
10 FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note.  
11 CHARLES MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 443 (2d ed. 1972); see also FED. R. EVID. 
405.  
12 MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at 443. 
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standards with which to determine the admissibility of this type of 
evidence.  
 
A. Other Bad Acts Evidence 
 
 Admissibility of prior acts evidence, especially in the context of 
prior bad acts, poses substantial risks. Other bad acts evidence is often 
highly prejudicial, tending to “distract the trier of fact from the main 
question of what actually happened on the particular occasion . . . [and 
subtly permitting] . . . the trier of fact to reward the good man and to 
punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what 
the evidence in the case shows actually happened.”13 The introduction 
of other bad acts evidence may further prejudice the defendant by 
creating an unfair risk of surprise, thereby robbing him or her of the 
opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.14 It “saddles a person with 
disabilities because of prior conduct”15 and “violates a social 
commitment to the thesis that each person remains mentally free and 
autonomous at every point in his [or her] life.”16 The nature of the 
evidence is problematic as well; the evidence is often of little 
probative value, yet its introduction is unduly time-consuming. Its 
admissibility may even be unconstitutional, implicating, in the context 
of other criminal acts, the prohibition against double jeopardy17 or the 
right against self-incrimination.18 Recognizing the severity of the risks 
                                                 
13 FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note. 
14 See JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 54.1 (1983 
& Supp. 1983). 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  
17 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 5239 (1978 & Supp. 1993) (“When the defendant has previously been 
acquitted of . . .  uncharged crimes, their evidentiary use undermines the values that 
support the prohibition on double jeopardy.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No 
person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb . . . .”).  
18 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 17, at § 5239 (“The privilege against self-
incrimination can be eroded where the defendant is forced to take the stand to 
answer the uncharged offenses, thus emphasizing his failure to testify as to the 
 198
3
Padgett: How Less Is More: The Unraveling of the Inextricable Intertwineme
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
and high likelihood of their occurrence, American courts exercise great 
caution in admitting such evidence. 
 Federal Rule of Evidence 404 embodies the current American rule 
regarding the admissibility of other bad acts evidence: “Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”19 
However, Rule 404(b) bans this evidence only when it is being used as 
propensity evidence, i.e., to demonstrate an individual’s propensity to 
act in a certain way based on his or her prior conduct.20 The 
prohibition against this use of character evidence “is so deeply 
embedded in our jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional 
proportions.”21 However, Rule 404(b) provides an exception for 
certain uses of a specific kind of character evidence; the evidence 
“may . . . be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence 
of mistake or accident.”22 Proponents must offer the evidence for 
specific identified purposes, with the proponent only able to argue and 
the trier of fact only able to consider the evidence as possible proof of 
the elements for which it was offered.23 Once a permissible, non-
propensity theory of relevance has been identified, the court cannot 
exclude the evidence unless it finds that “its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
                                                                                                                   
charged offense.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
19 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  
20 Id.  
21 Fed. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee’s note (1991).  
22 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). For a discussion on the effective limitations of this 
clause, see infra notes 221–26 and accompanying text.  
23 See Jason M. Brauser, Comment, Intrinsic or Extrinsic?: The Confusing 
Distinction Between Inextricably Intertwined Evidence and Other Crimes Evidence 
Under Rule 404(b), 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1582, 1598 (1994) (“Congress intended the 
court to specify the purposes for which it will use the evidence in order to foster 
greater admissibility while still guarding against impermissible character uses.”).  
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delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence”24 under Rule 403.25 
 
B. Inextricable Intertwinement Doctrine 
 
 The inextricable intertwinement doctrine is frequently invoked as 
a basis of admissibility for other bad acts evidence. This judicially-
created doctrine allows bad acts evidence to be admitted when it is 
intertwined with other admissible evidence in such a way that “it helps 
to complete the story of the crime by filling a conceptual or 
chronological void”26 or “is so blended or connected that it 
incidentally involves, explains the circumstances surrounding, or tends 
to prove any element of, the charged crime.”27 The doctrine is 
premised on the fact that evidence inextricably intertwined with the 
charged conduct is, by its very nature, not other bad acts and therefore, 
does not implicate Rule 404(b).28 As such, evidence admitted under 
this doctrine is not subject to the same constraints as evidence under 
Rule 404(b).29  
 
                                                 
24 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
25 FED. R. EVID. 404(b) Senate Judiciary Committee’s note. (“It is anticipated 
that with respect to permissible uses for such evidence, the trial judge may exclude it 
only on the basis of those considerations set forth in Rule 403, i.e., prejudice, 
confusion or waste of time.”). 
26 See, e.g., United States v. Luster, 480 F.3d 551, 556–57 (7th Cir. 2007) . 
27 See, e.g., United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 760 (7th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Gougis, 432 F.3d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ojomo, 332 
D.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
28 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 17, § 5239, at 427, 445. 
29 United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011, 1019 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[E]vidence 
admitted under this doctrine ‘lie[s] outside the purview of the Rule 404(b) 
character/propensity prohibition,’ and is not subject to its constraints regarding the 
manner in which the evidence may be used.”) (citations omitted); see also infra 
notes 229–43 and accompanying text.  
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1. Development 
 
 The inextricable intertwinement exception to the prohibition 
against other bad acts evidence first emerged as the “inseparable 
crimes exception.”30 While the court in People v. Molineux31 readily 
acknowledged that “the exceptions to the rule [of the inadmissibility of 
other bad acts evidence’s inadmissibility] cannot be stated with 
categorical precision,”32 the court clearly recognized an inextricable 
intertwinement exception.33 In that case, Ronald Molineux was 
charged with murder in the first degree for his alleged involvement in 
the death of Katharine Adams.34 Molineux sent by mail a bottle 
labeled “Bromo Seltzer” to Adams’s housemate, Harry Cornish; 
however, instead of containing Bromo Seltzer, the bottle contained 
cyanide of mercury, a type of poison.35 Cornish innocently 
administered the contents of the bottle to Adams while attempting to 
treat a headache of hers, and thus, inadvertently caused her death.36 
During the course of the trial, the prosecution presented evidence of 
Molineux’s alleged involvement with the murder of Henry Barnet, 
who had died seven weeks earlier.37 Prior to his death, a bottle labeled 
as “Kutnow powder” had been sent to Barnet through the mail.38 
When this bottle was tested after Barnet’s death, it was discovered that 
rather than containing the indicated Kutnow powder, the bottle 
actually contained cyanide of mercury.39 This same type of poison had 
also killed Barnet.40 Molineux was not charged with Barnet’s death.41 
The prosecution presented evidence of Barnet’s death in an attempt to 
                                                 
30 Brauser, supra note 23, at 1594–95. 
31 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).  
32 Id. at 293.  
33 Id. at 293, 299–302. 
34 Id. at 287. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 287–88.  
37 Id. at 289–90.  
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 290.  
41 Id. at 286. 
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prove Molineux’s guilt in murdering Adams.42 Molineux appealed the 
resulting conviction to the New York Court of Appeals.43 The court of 
appeals strongly emphasized the general rule prohibiting the use of 
any other bad acts evidence.44 The court did, however, recognize the 
existence of a few exceptions to this rule and reasoned that other bad 
acts evidence may be competent to prove, inter alia, “a common 
scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so 
related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others.”45  
 Although at first blush, it would appear that the court was 
recognizing an exception only for other bad acts evidence that 
demonstrated a common plan or scheme, the court’s further 
development of the exception indicated that it also intended this 
exception to encompass other bad acts evidence inextricably 
intertwined with the charged crime. In elaborating upon the exception, 
the court indicated that the exception is meant to encompass situations 
in which “two or more crimes are committed by the same person in 
pursuance of a single design, or under circumstances which render it 
impossible to prove one without proving all.”46 Though the court’s 
discussion focused primarily upon the common scheme or plan prong 
of the exception, it is clear that the notion of inextricably intertwined 
evidence is separate and distinct. For this exception to apply, “there 
must be evidence of [a] system between the offense on trial and the 
one sought to be introduced. They must be connected as parts of a 
general and composite plan or scheme, or they must be so related to 
each other as to show a common motive or intent running through 
both.”47 The exception is extremely narrow, requiring a connection 
between the crimes “to have existed both in fact and in the mind of the 
actor.”48 If a court is unable to “clearly perceive” the connection, the 
                                                 
42 Id. at 289. 
43 Id. at 287. 
44 Id. at 292–93.  
45 Id. at 294.  
46 Id. at 299 (emphasis added).  
47 Id. (emphasis added).  
48 Id.  
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dangers of admitting such evidence indicate that the “the accused 
should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the evidence rejected.”49 
 Turning to the facts of the case, the Molineux court held that the 
evidence of Barnet’s death was not inextricably intertwined with 
Adams’ murder.50 Given the entirely unrelated motives for each 
murder (health club quarrels versus jealousy regarding a female’s 
affections, respectively) and the length of time between the murders 
(eight weeks), the court found it “impossible to perceive any legal 
connection between the two cases.”51 Although the methods were 
similar in each murder, “the methods referred to are as identical as any 
two shootings, stabbings, or assaults, but no more so.”52 Without a 
common plan or any similarities in motive or intent, the admission of 
the evidence of Barnet’s murder was a “clear error of law” and 
necessitated reversal of Molineux’s conviction.53  
 
2. Modern Application of the Inextricable Intertwinement Doctrine in 
the Seventh Circuit 
 
The current state of the inextricable intertwinement doctrine is a 
far cry from the original form pronounced in Molineux, which 
encompassed only “circumstances which render[ed] it impossible to 
prove one without proving all.”54 The Seventh Circuit now considers 
other crimes evidence to be inextricably intertwined with the charged 
conduct when:  (1) the evidence is so blended or connected that it 
incidentally involves, explains the circumstances surrounding, or tends 
to prove any element of the charged crime, (2) the absence of the 
evidence would create a chronological or conceptual void in the story 
of the charged crime, or (3) the evidence completes the story of the 
                                                 
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 301. 
51 Id. at 293. 
52 Id. at 301.  
53 Id. at 311.  
54 Id. at 299. 
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charged crime.55 With the courts’ expansion of the doctrine, it has 
morphed from one of practical necessity—essential to convicting 
individuals of their charged crimes—to one of convenience.  
 This transformation has not gone unnoticed. Critics have widely 
criticized the doctrine as well as the courts’ inconsistent and overly 
broad application of it.56 The courts are not entirely to blame, 
however; the doctrine itself offers little by way of guidance.  
“Inextricably intertwined,” “intricately related,” “blended,” and 
“connected,” for example, are all nebulous terms, having only 
relational meaning. “[T]he test creates confusion because, quite 
simply, no one knows what it means.”57 It is the “vacuous nature of 
the test’s wording”58 that gives rise to the doctrine’s criticism, as this
is precisely what makes the doctrine dangerous. The doctrine’s lack o
clarity is “a virtual invitation for abuse.”
 
f 
                                                
59 Even with the best 
intentions, it may be impossible for a court to accurately and 
consistently apply the doctrine. However, courts are often condemned 
as having less than the best intentions, “substitut[ing] a careful 
analysis with [the doctrine’s] boilerplate jargon.”60 Rather than 
actually analyzing the necessity of the evidence, courts simply label 
 
55 See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 1102 (7th Cir. 1995). 
“Every circuit now applies some formulation of the inextricably intertwined ‘test.’” 
United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927–28 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
56 See generally Brauser, supra note 23; Milton Hirsch, “This New-Born Babe 
an Infant Hercules”: The Doctrine of “Inextricably Intertwined” Evidence in 
Florida's Drug Wars, 25 NOVA L. REV. 279 (2000); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The 
Second Coming of Res Gestae: A Procedural Approach to Untangling the 
“Inextricably Intertwined” Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused’s 
Uncharged Misconduct, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 719 (2010). 
57 United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 246 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 363 (2010). 
58 Imwinkelried, supra note 56, at 729. 
59 Id. at 730; see also Brauser, supra note 23, at 1610–11 (describing a case in 
which the court found that other bad acts evidence set the “tone for the relationship” 
between the defendant and an undercover agent although the tone of the relationship 
was clearly not an element of the charged offenses). 
60 Green, 617 F.3d at 246.  
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the evidence as inextricably intertwined when in fact, the evidence 
was “anything but inseparable.”61  
 
a. Evidence “so blended or connected that it incidentally involves, 
explains the circumstances surrounding, or tends to prove any element 
of the charged crime” 
 
 Uncharged criminal activity arising from the same transaction or 
transactions as the crime charged is said to incidentally involve the 
charged crime and as such, is admitted as inextricably intertwined 
evidence.62 In United States v. Gibson,63 the defendant was charged 
with four counts of distributing and possessing crack cocaine with the 
intent to distribute.64 During one of the charged sales, the defendant 
agreed to sell two handguns to an undercover agent.65 Evidence of the 
potential gun sales was admitted at trial as inextricably intertwined, 
and the defendant appealed on that basis.66 The Seventh Circuit upheld 
the admission, finding that because the defendant and the undercover 
agent “were negotiating the sale of crack cocaine and guns at the same 
time in the same conversations,” the evidence was inextricably 
intertwined.67  
The Seventh Circuit also considers evidence that explains the 
circumstances surrounding the charged crime to be inextricably 
                                                 
61 Imwinkelried, supra note 56, at 730.  
62 United States v. Gibson, 170 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Uncharged 
criminal activity is admissible under the ‘intricately related’ doctrine if it arises from 
the same transaction or transactions as the charged crimes.”). 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 676. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. at 680.  
67 Id. at 681–82; see also United States v. Parkin, 917 F.2d 313, 317 (7th Cir. 
1990) (holding evidence of conversation about potential cocaine sale that occurred 
during charged marijuana sale inextricably intertwined); United States v. Hawkins, 
823 F.2d 1020, 1023 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding evidence that defendant offered to 
exchange guns for cocaine during charged gun transaction was inextricably 
intertwined because statements were made during same transaction), overruled on 
other grounds by United States v. Baldwin, 60 F.3d 363 (7th Cir.1995). 
 205
10
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 7
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
intertwined. For example, in United States v. Strong,68 the defendant 
was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and in 
possession of ammunition.69 During his trial, the district court 
admitted evidence that drugs were sold at the defendant’s home partly 
because it “helped explain why he would possess [the firearm and 
ammunition].”70 The Seventh Circuit upheld the admission, explaining 
that evidence of “drug trafficking supplies a motive for having [a] gun 
. . .  [b]ecause weapons are ‘tools of the trade’ of drug dealers.”71 The 
court found that evidence of the defendant’s involvement in drug 
trafficking explained the circumstances surrounding his possession of 
the firearm and ammunition.72 In United States v. Richmond,73 the 
defendant was charged with, among other things, conspiracy for 
making false statements to obtain a firearm.74 The Seventh Circuit 
again held that evidence of the defendant’s gang association was 
inextricably intertwined with the charged conspiracy, as the evidence 
explained the circumstances surrounding the relationships of the 
involved individuals.75  
 Furthermore, evidence directly probative of the charged crime is 
admissible in the Seventh Circuit under the inextricable 
intertwinement doctrine, as it tends to prove an element of the charged 
crime. For example, in United States v. Roberts,76 the defendant was 
charged with conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, armed bank 
robbery, use of a firearm in commission of a federal felony, and 
possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony.77 
Evidence that the defendant was “caught with a dark steel revolver 
with a brown handle matching the description of the weapon he used 
only two days earlier to rob [a] Joliet bank [was] directly relevant to 
                                                 
68 485 F.3d 985 (7th Cir. 2007).  
69 Id. at 986.  
70 Id. at 990.  
71 Id. (quoting United States v. Stokes, 211 F.3d 1039, 1042 (7th Cir. 2000)).  
72 Id.   
73 222 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2000). 
74 Id. at 415. 
75 Id. at 416–17.  
76 933 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1991). 
77 Id. at 517. 
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the crimes with which he was charged.”78As such, the court 
considered the evidence to be inextricably intertwined.79 Similarly
United States v. Muhammad,
, in 
ion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ed and upheld its admission as such.  
                                                
80 the defendant appealed his convict
for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and 
possession of ammunition by a felon.81 Police initially encountered the
defendant after being called to the scene of a shooting.82 After the 
defendant fled the scene, the police obtained a search warrant for his
home, where they found several boxes of ammunition.83 The 
defendant challenged admission of testimony regarding the shooting
scene as well as the admission of ammunition.84 Testimony about the 
defendant’s presence and flight from the shooting scene was admitted
to put his arrest “in context” and formed “at least in part the basis for 
the indictment on [a charge of which he was acquitted] and for the 
ammunition possession count.”85 As such, “the testimony was 
‘directly relevant to the crimes charged.’”86 Evidence that the 
defendant possessed the ammunition for which he was charged with
possessing “was direct evidence of the crime for which [he] was
indicted.”87 The court considered this evidence to be inextricably 
intertwin 88
Although in some situations, the evidence may in fact be 
inextricably intertwined, the cases discussed above demonstrate the 
court’s cavalier attitude to actually making that determination. For 
example, in United States v. Gibson,89 evidence that the defendant 
attempted to negotiate the sale of firearms was found to be 
inextricably intertwined with the four charged counts of distributing 
 
78 Id. at 520.  
79 Id.  
80 928 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir. 1991). 
81 Id. at 1463.  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 1468.  
85 Id.  
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 170 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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and possessing with the intent to distribute cocaine base.90 The 
attempted sale of the firearms was not an element of the charged 
crime;91 nor would the jury have been confused by the witness’s 
testimony had evidence of the conversation remained unoffered. 
Admittedly, evidence of any conversation relating to drugs may have 
been relevant; however, evidence of an entirely separate topic 
discussed by happenstance during the charged transactions is as 
inextricably intertwined with the charged crime as any conversations 
about the weather that may have taken place during that transaction.92 
Even a cursory analysis would have revealed that the evidence of the 
defendant’s attempted firearm sale could easily have been extricated 
without harm to the prosecution’s case. Furthermore, it is not 
necessary to prove the circumstances surrounding a charged crime in 
order to prove the charged crime itself. By deeming evidence of 
extraneous circumstances “inextricable,” the Seventh Circuit has 
misinterpreted what “inextricable” actually means. 
 
b. Evidence whose “absence would create a chronological or 
conceptual void in the story of the crime” 
 
 Evidence necessary to avoid a chronological or conceptual void in 
the story of the crime is also frequently admitted as inextricably 
intertwined evidence. For example, in United States v. Adamo,93 the 
defendant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.94 He 
challenged his conviction based partly on the district court’s decision 
to admit evidence of his personal cocaine use.95 During his trial, the 
prosecution offered testimony that he had purchased and consumed a 
“sample” of cocaine on the date that the alleged conspiracy began.96 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that 
                                                 
90 Id. at 676.  
91 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). 
92 See Gibson, 170 F.3d at 676.  
93 882 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1989). 
94 Id. at 1220 
95 Id. at 1234. 
96 Id.  
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without the evidence, there would have been a “‘chronological and 
conceptual void’ in the witness[es’] testimony” as they recounted the 
events of that day.97 Similarly, in United States v. Hattaway,98 
evidence of the victim’s boyfriend’s death was admitted in the 
defendants’ trial for the abduction and holding of the victim.99 
Evidence of the circumstances of the death implicated the defendant 
and the victim’s boyfriend in other crimes; this evidence helped the 
jury understand, for example, why the victim failed to call the 
authorities, which if absent would have left a chronological and 
conceptual void in the account of her ordeal.100 However, as is eviden
from discussions of these cases, evidence is now deemed to be 
inextricably intertwined when there is any type of chronological or 
conceptual void. Admission is no longer reserved for circumstances 
without which there would be a nonsensical void; rather, admission
now the regular course of action if there is any resulting chronolo
t 
 is 
gical 
or c
e 
o 
e jury. 
ate lines 
                                                
onceptual void. 
Evidence of a defendant’s role in previous bad acts that constitut
necessary preliminary steps in completing the crime charged is als
considered inextricably intertwined; without such evidence, there 
would be a chronological or conceptual void that may confuse th
In United States v. Cox,101 the court admitted evidence that the 
defendant had committed credit card fraud as inextricably intertwined 
with the charged crimes of persuading an individual to cross st
with the intent to engage in prostitution and with transporting 
individuals under the age of 18 across state lines to engage in 
prostitution.102 The court found that evidence of credit card fraud 
established that the defendant had sufficient resources to be a “pimp” 
and proved how he “had the means to pay for the hotel gatherings at 
which he promoted his prostitution business.”103 The court reasoned 
 
97 Id.  
98 740 F.2d 1419 (7th Cir. 1984). 
99 Id. at 1424–25.  
100 Id. at 1425.  
101 577 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2009). 
102 Id. at 834.  
103 Id. at 839. 
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that without an understanding of the defendant’s involvement
preliminary step, there would have been a chronologi
 in that 
cal and 
conceptual void in the story of the charged crime.104 
 
c. Evidence that “completes the story of the crime charged”  
 
y to 
at 
ense of the 
 
                                                
 
 Most other bad acts evidence can be said to complete the story of
the charged crime; as such, the court often considers this categor
overlap with the other categorical bases of admissibility.105 For 
example, in Gibson,106 the court explicitly found that “there were 
least two bases for admitting the gun evidence.”107 In addition to 
viewing the evidence as so blended or connected to be inextricably 
intertwined,108 the gun evidence “was [also] necessary to provide the 
jury with the ‘complete story’” of the defendant’s crimes; negotiations 
about the gun were so intertwined with the drug sales “that admission 
of the portions of the taped conversations pertaining to gun sales was 
necessary to enable the jury to fully understand and make s
underlying negotiations for the sale of crack cocaine.”109  
 Similarly, in Hattaway,110 in addition to considering evidence of
the victim’s boyfriend’s death necessary to avoid a chronological or 
conceptual void,111 the evidence also helped complete the story of the 
victim’s ordeal. The evidence of the defendants’ role in her boyfriend’s 
death explained why the defendants kidnapped her only to release her 
 
7th Cir. 2007), with United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 
1102
es v. Gibson, 170 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 accompanying text. 
5 (7th Cir. 1984). 
panying text.  
104 Id.  
105 This trend is unsurprising given the court’s changing formulations of the 
inextricable intertwinement doctrine; the court now considers the “complete the 
story” basis of intertwinement to be the same as the “chronological or conceptual 
void” basis, contrary to earlier formulations. Compare, e.g., United States v. Luster, 
480 F.3d 551, 556–57 (
 (7th Cir. 1995).  
106 United Stat
107 Id. at 681. 
108 See supra notes 62–67 and
109 Gibson, 170 F.3d at 682.  
110 United States v. Hattaway, 740 F.2d 1419, 1424–2
111 See supra notes 93–100 and accom
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after her boyfriend’s body was found.112 However, the court frequ
upholds the admission of other bad acts evidence, citing only the 
“completes the story” basis of intertwinement. For example, in United 
States v. Harris,
ently 
e 
of 
y would 
al inextricableness lest it admit 
angerous evidence unnecessarily. 
 
II.  THE UNRAVELING OF T CABLE INTERTWINEMENT 
DOCTRINE 
 
. 
ing the 
nt 
doctrine, the Seventh Circuit seems to have “lost its way.”117  
 
                                                
113 the Seventh Circuit considered testimony regarding 
the defendant’s “modus operandi for the sale of drugs . . . including th
negotiations, the purchase, the transfer of the cocaine, and the use 
code language” as necessary to complete the story of the charged 
crime of distributing cocaine.114 Without this evidence, the jur
have had “a somewhat confusing and incomplete picture.”115 
However, “all relevant prosecution evidence explains the crime or 
completes the story.”116 Therefore, the court must engage in careful 
consideration of the evidence’s actu
d
HE INEXTRI
 
Often, however, the Seventh Circuit is not specific as to why it 
considers evidence inextricably intertwined. Even in the circumstances
in which the court is explicit, there is still significant overlap between 
the categories, demonstrating, in part, the loose nature of the doctrine
This looseness, as well as courts’ seeming difficulty in apply
doctrine, has caused widespread criticism. Like many other 
jurisdictions attempting to apply the inextricable intertwineme
 
 
 
 
112 Hattaway, 740 F.2d at 1424–25.  
113 271 F.3d 690, 705 (7th Cir. 2001).  
114 Id. 
115 Id.  
116 United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
117 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404:5, at 709 
n.22 (6th ed. 2006).  
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t 
 vocal 
ted 
ls of 
 the 
e 
that 
s 
ly 
t as if the government 
      
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Growing Dissatisfaction  
 
Criticisms of the doctrine have not gone unnoticed, however, a
least by the Seventh Circuit. The court has become increasingly
in expressing its own concerns regarding the doctrine and serious 
doubts about the doctrine’s continuing viability. The court had 
occasion to consider two instances of other crimes evidence admit
under the inextricably intertwined doctrine in United States v. 
Taylor.118 Taylor and Hogsett were convicted in separate tria
distributing crack.119 Both appealed their convictions based on
lower courts’ admission of other crimes evidence under the 
inextricable intertwinement doctrine, and the Seventh Circuit 
consolidated their appeals.120 During Taylor’s trial, the prosecution 
presented evidence that Taylor was a known crack dealer, with th
arresting officer, among others, testifying.121 The officer testified 
he knew Taylor to be a crack dealer based on knowledge gained 
“throughout his career as a police officer and as a drug and gang 
officer.”122 This testimony implied to the jury that Taylor had a long 
history of drug and gang activity and thus was the basis of Taylor’
appeal.123 The prosecution argued that the testimony was inextricab
intertwined with the rest of the officer’s testimony; the statement 
explained why the officer arrested Taylor for the admittedly trivial 
offense of illegally tinted automobile windows: he knew Taylor’s car 
and knew him to be a crack dealer.124 However, the “evidence was at 
once irrelevant and damaging, as was the officer’s testimony about his 
prior professional knowledge of Taylor. It is no
                                           
118 522 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Taylor v. United States, 129 
S. Ct nd cert. denied, Hogsett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308 (2009). 
2. 
t 733.  
4.  
. 190 (2008), a
119 Id. at 73
120 Id. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. a
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 733–3
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had 
r 
 
 
ed that 
, 
forming “an integral part of the witness’ 
acco e 
 
nce of 
’ 
ably 
 in 
 
                                                
to try to justify the arrest on the basis not of the traffic offenses but 
of suspicion that Taylor was a drug dealer.”125 
Hogsett’s appeal was based on the trial testimony of the passenge
in his car at the time of his arrest.126 She testified that she and Hogsett 
were on their way “to hit a lick” when he was arrested and explained 
that this meant that they were going to sell drugs.127 When questioned
as to how she knew what “hit a lick” meant, she indicated that she had
hit licks with Hogsett in the past.128 This last statement indicat
the defendant had a history selling drugs, which was why the defense 
objected to its admission.129 The government argued that this 
statement was inextricably intertwined with the rest of her testimony
filling a conceptual void and 
unt of the circumstances surrounding the offenses of which th
defendant was indicted.”130  
In determining the propriety of admitting the statements into 
evidence, the court expressed two interpretations of the inextricable
intertwinement doctrine: “evidence ‘intrinsic’ to the charged crime 
itself, in the sense of being evidence of the crime” or “evide
another crime [that] may be introduced in order to ‘complete the story
of the charged crime.”131 However, “neither formulation is 
satisfactory: to courts adopting the former, ‘inextricably intertwined 
evidence is intrinsic, and evidence is intrinsic if it is inextricably 
intertwined,’ while ‘the ‘complete the story’ definition of ‘inextric
intertwined’ threatens to override Rule 404(b).”132 The court found
these two instances that the statements constituted impermissible 
character evidence, implying to the jury that the defendants were 
longtime drug offenders and suggesting that they were therefore more
likely to have committed the charged drug offenses.133 The police 
 
125 Id. at 734.  
126 Id. at 735.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id.  
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 734. 
132 Id. (citing United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927–28 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).  
133 Taylor, 522 F.3d at 735–36. 
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officer’s testimony was “just a way of telling the jury that t
knew Taylor to have been a drug offender and gang member for a long 
time and that at the time of the arrest Taylor was a wanted 
criminal.”
he officer 
entally involve’ the charged crime, 
it is
 
bly 
tions 
 
r’s 
 
al with 
                                                
134 The same rationale applied to Hogsett’s case.135 The 
court recognized that the inextricable intertwinement doctrine’s 
“vagueness invites prosecutors to expand the exceptions to the rule 
beyond the proper boundaries of the exceptions.”136 “A defendant’s 
bad act may be only tangentially related to the charged crime, but it 
nevertheless could ‘complete the story’ or ‘incidentally involve’ the 
charged offense or ‘explain the circumstances.’ If the prosecution’s 
evidence did not ‘explain’ or ‘incid
 difficult to see how it could pass the minimal requirement for 
admissibility that evidence be relevant.”137  
This potential for abuse motivated the court to carefully consider
whether the evidence could be admissible under any of Rule 404(b)’s 
exceptions. “Almost all evidence admissible under the ‘inextrica
interwoven’ doctrine is admissible under one of the specific excep
in Rule 404(b).”138 In actively re-directing the evidence to Rule 
404(b), the court seemed to be attempting to redirect judges and 
lawyers to the Rule’s exceptions as the primary basis to admit other 
bad acts evidence. The court essentially re-offered the evidence it 
deemed inadmissible under the inextricable intertwinement doctrine
under Rule 404(b). For example, the court argued that the office
testimony in Taylor’s case could have been offered to demonstrate 
identity: “the fact that a defendant’s buyers had dealt with him 
previously could explain how they were able to identify him, why they
picked him for the controlled buy, and why he was willing to de
them.”139 Similarly, the court argued that the passenger’s testimony in 
Hogsett’s case could have been offered to show the absence of 
 
5. 
134 Id. at 735.  
135 Id. at 734–3
136 Id. at 735.  
137 Id. at 734.  
138 Id. at 735.  
139 Id. at 734.  
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mistake.140 The court pointed out that without the explanation of how 
the passenger knew the meaning of “hit a lick,” the defense could have 
challenged the accuracy of her understanding for lack of foundation in 
its closing argument, leaving the prosecution no opportunity to present
contrary evidence.
 
d not 
ule 404(b); however, its distaste for the inextricable 
e 
 
 
ne 
 
 
details of the sale, the informant resorted to contacting Hughes 
                                                
141 Therefore, the prosecution could have offered 
the testimony as a way of demonstrating absence of mistake.142 
Although the court determined that the evidence was improperly 
admitted under the inextricable intertwinement doctrine, given the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt at the trials, the errors were deemed 
harmless.143 Given the harmless nature of the errors, the court di
address the impact of the proper alternative bases of admissibility 
under R
intertwinement doctrine and strong preference for admission under 
Rule 404(b) was clear. 
 The court’s strong preference for the use of Rule 404(b) as th
basis of admissibility for other bad acts evidence is also evident in
United States v. Conner.144 An FBI informant participated in two 
controlled purchases of crack cocaine.145 During the first buy on
December 20, 2006, the informant called Conner’s co-defendant, 
Hughes, to request a quarter ounce of crack cocaine.146 Hughes 
indicated that although he did not have that amount, he knew someo
who did: Conner.147 Hughes instructed the informant to meet him at 
Conner’s residence, and there, Conner provided the informant with
5.737 grams of crack cocaine.148 For the second buy on January 10, 
2007, the informant called Conner directly to request the drugs.149
However, when Conner did not return the informant’s call to provide 
 
t 735.  
1 (7th Cir. 2009).  
t 1016. 
140 Id. a
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
143 Id. at 734–35.  
144 583 F.3d 101
145 Id. a
146 Id.  
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
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again.150 Hughes was able to make contact with Conner, who directed 
him to another co-defendant, Robison.151 Robison was in possession 
of some of Conner’s crack cocaine supply, from which Conner 
instructed him to provide the requisite amount to Hughes.152 Robison 
met the informant and Hughes at a local drug store and made the 
exchange.153 Conner was not present at this exchange.154 Conner was 
har 155  
f 
r.157 
 
 
elped 
nts as well 
le 
common scheme or plan.161 The district court did not address the 
                                                
c ged only for his involvement with the December 20, 2006, buy.
 During Conner’s trial, the government introduced evidence of 
Conner’s involvement with the January 10 buy, as well as evidence o
his prior drug-dealing relationships with his co-defendants, Hughes 
and Robison.156 Both Hughes and Robison pled guilty and agreed to 
cooperate with the government, with both testifying against Conne
Hughes testified to his and Conner’s long history of selling drugs 
together and to the specifics of how Conner would prepare the crack
cocaine as well as how much money Conner would typically make 
from these drug sales.158 Robison testified to his involvement in 
Conner’s operation, serving as a middleman making pickups and 
deliveries of cocaine.159 The government argued that this evidence was
inextricably intertwined with evidence of the charged crime; it h
provide the jury with a more complete picture, illustrating and 
providing context for the relationship among the co-defenda
as indicating that the sale was not an isolated event.160 The 
government alternatively argued that the evidence was admissib
under Rule 404(b), as it demonstrated knowledge, intent, and a 
 
150 Id. 
151 Id.  
152 Id. at 1016–17. 
153 Id. at 1017.  
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 Id. 
159 Id.  
160 Id. at 1020.  
161 Id. at 1017. 
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evidence’s admissibility under Rule 404(b) and opted instead to admit 
the evidence under the inextricable intertwinement doctrine.162  
 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the evidence was 
inadmissible under the inextricable intertwinement doctrine.163 As 
Conner was charged only with distribution, the jury did not need to 
understand the relationship among the co-defendants or the 
circumstances surrounding the January 10 buy.164 Neither evidence of 
Conner’s relationship with his co-defendants nor his involvement in 
the January 10 sale was “necessary to complete the story of the single 
[distribution] on trial. Nor was it needed to avoid a conceptual or 
chronological void in the story of the [charged distribution].”165 
Therefore, admission under the inextricable intertwinement doctrine 
was inappropriate.166 The court again emphasized the potential for 
abuse of the doctrine and its strong preference for the use of Rule 
404(b).167  
 However, the court acknowledged that the doctrines, at least in 
theory, have distinct purposes.168 Evidence rightfully admitted under 
the inextricable intertwinement doctrine does not fall within the 
meaning of ‘other acts’ contemplated by Rule 404(b).169 “[E]vidence 
concerning the chronological unfolding of events that led to an 
indictment, or other circumstances surrounding the crime, is not 
evidence of ‘other acts’ within the meaning of [Rule] 404(b).”170 As 
the evidence in Conner’s case related to “separate transactions that 
took place at separate times . . . [this evidence] . . . falls squarely 
within the types of ‘other acts’ contemplated by Rule 404(b).”171 After 
a brief explanation of Rule 404(b)’s exceptions, the court found that 
                                                 
162 Id.  
163 Id. at 1020.  
164 Id.  
165 Id. at 1020–21 (quoting United States v. Simpson, 479 F.3d 492, 501 (7th 
Cir. 2007)).  
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 1020.  
168 Id. at 1021. 
169 Id.  
170 Id. (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 1102 (7th Cir. 1995)).  
171 Id. 
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evidence of Conner’s prior drug relationship with his co-defendants 
and his involvement with the January 10 sale were relevant to prove 
absence of mistake, knowledge, and intent.172  
 In so holding, the Conner court seemed to be reconsidering the 
position developed in Taylor. By recognizing the distinct purposes that 
the doctrines are meant to serve and attempting to classify the 
evidence accordingly, the court indicated that there are situations in 
which inextricably intertwined evidence will not be admissible under 
Rule 404(b). While the Taylor court recognized this possibility,173 its 
focus was on the overlap between the two doctrines as bases of 
admissibility rather than the differences.174 The Conner court seemed 
to be offering the inextricable intertwinement doctrine another chance 
at life, provided that attorneys arguing for evidence’s admissibility 
under the doctrine and lower court judges realize the potential dangers 
of recklessly invoking the doctrine and follow the Seventh Circuit’s 
guidance to begin using the doctrine in a safe and responsible 
manner.175 
 
B. The End of the Inextricable Intertwinement Doctrine in the Seventh 
Circuit 
 
However, in July 2010, the Seventh Circuit put the final nail in the 
doctrine’s proverbial coffin.176 The court explicitly abolished this 
theory of admissibility for other bad acts evidence in United States v. 
Gorman,177 overturning a long history of allowing evidence to be 
admitted under this doctrine. 
The Gorman case came before the court on appeal from the 
Southern District of Indiana.178 Defendant Jamarkus Gorman had been 
                                                 
172 Id. at 1021–22.  
173 See United States v. Taylor 522 F.3d 731, 734–36 (7th Cir. 2008). 
174 Id. at 735 (“Almost all evidence admissible under the ‘inextricably 
interwoven’ doctrine is admissible under one of the specific exceptions in Rule 
404(b), or under the judge-made ‘no confusion’ exception . . . .”). 
175 Conner, 583 F.3d at 1024–25.  
176 See United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010). 
177 Id.  
178 Id. at 711–12. 
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convicted of perjury after giving false testimony before a grand jury in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623.179 In the course of investigating 
Gorman’s cousin for drug trafficking, federal agents obtained and 
executed a search warrant for Gorman’s home, intending to seize a 
Bentley automobile they believed had been obtained by the proceeds 
of the cousin’s illegal drug trafficking activities.180 The agents 
informed Gorman of their intentions, whereupon he indicated that he 
was unaware of any such Bentley.181 Gorman escorted the agents to 
the building’s garage and indicated parking spots 20 and 22 as his 
assigned parking spots.182 These parking spots were vacant, and the 
agents’ investigation concluded without recovery of the Bentley.183 
Despite his assignment to these parking spots, Gorman actually 
used parking spots 31A and B, in which the Bentley was parked.184 
These parking spaces, and thus the Bentley, were not visible from the 
parking spots that Gorman showed the agents.185 Following the 
agents’ departure, Gorman enlisted several unscrupulous individuals to
assist him in removing the Bentley from the building’s parking ga
altogether.
 
rage 
                                                
186 Upon Gorman’s instruction and direction, these 
individuals removed the Bentley by greasing the floor with oil to allow 
the Bentley’s tires to slide and loading the automobile into the bed of a 
flatbed tow truck.187 At the automobile shop to which the individuals 
had towed the Bentley, the men broke into the car by cutting the soft 
top and by prying open the trunk to remove bags of money.188 The car 
was subsequently abandoned and found shortly thereafter by the 
investigating agents.189  
 
179 Id. at 713; see 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2006).  
180 Gorman, 613 F.3d at 713.  
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 713–14. 
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 714. 
185 Id. at 713–14. 
186 Id. at 714.  
187 Id.  
188 Id.  
189 Id.  
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It was during the investigation of yet another alleged illegal 
activity perpetrated by his cousin that Gorman was called to testify 
before the grand jury.190 He was questioned about the Bentley, and it 
was his remarks on this subject that gave rise to the perjury case 
against him.191 The testimony was as follows: 
 
Grand Juror:  Mr. Gorman, did you have a Bentley in your 
garage at Lion’s Gate [his residence searched by the federal 
agents]? 
 
Jamarkus:  No.  
 
Grand Juror:  Ever?  
 
Jamarkus:  No, never.192  
 
Prior to the trial, the government notified Gorman of its intention 
to introduce evidence of his involvement in an uncharged conspiracy 
to obstruct justice by concealing evidence from federal officers in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)193—namely, evidence of Gorman’s 
involvement with the storage and subsequent theft of the Bentley.194 
Objecting to the use of such evidence, the defense filed a motion in 
limine seeking to suppress the evidence as impermissible other bad 
acts evidence under 404(b).195 The defense argued that the evidence 
tended to prove only Gorman’s propensity to commit perjury by 
subjecting him to the risk that the jury would “assume that anyone 
who would commit such a theft would have a propensity to commit 
the somewhat less extravagant perjury that was charged.”196 The 
                                                 
190 Id. at 714–15. 
191 Id. at 715.  
192 Id. 
193 Id.  
194 Id.  
195 Id. 
196 Brief and Required Combined Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Jamarkus 
Gorman at 8, United States v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3010).  
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government argued for the admissibility of the evidence, claiming that 
the evidence of the storage and theft “provide[d] an explanation of 
why [Gorman] would make the charged false declaration,” filling 
“what would otherwise be a gaping conceptual void.”197 The district 
court admitted this evidence under the inextricable intertwinement 
doctrine, finding that the evidence was “inextricably intertwined to 
[sic] the fact of the perjury . . . and provides an explanation to the jury 
to understand why the defendant would . . . provide the false 
statement.”198 The district court thus included the evidence of 
Gorman’s involvement with the Bentley as evidence of his motivation 
to commit perjury.199 The jury convicted Gorman of perjury and 
sentenced him to thirty-six months of imprisonment.200  
Gorman appealed his conviction to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit based on, inter alia, the admission of 
the evidence relating to his involvement in the storage and theft of the 
Bentley.201 A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard.202 The appellate court gives special 
deference to the trial court’s rulings and should reverse only where the 
record contains no evidence on which the district court judge could 
have rationally based his or her evidentiary ruling.203 In determining 
whether the district court improperly admitted the evidence, the 
Seventh Circuit reviewed the three general bases of admissibility of 
                                                 
197 Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America at 33, United States 
v. Gorman, 613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-3010). 
198 Brief and Required Combined Appendix of Defendant-Appellant Jamarkus 
Gorman, supra note 196, at 18. 
199 The district court found that “to include the facts as alleged that it had to do 
with retrieving or claiming the money that was stashed in the automobile, and that it 
was allegedly drug proceeds, are also relevant facts, and the prejudicial value of 
which does not outweigh the probative value in this case because they are 
inextricably intertwined to [sic] the fact of the perjury, and that is alleged in the 
indictment, and provides an explanation to the jury to understand why the defendant 
would, if the Government can prove that he did, provide the false statement . . . .” 
Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America, supra note 197, at 16. 
200 Gorman, 613 F.3d at 715. 
201 Id.  
202 United States v. Joseph, 310 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2002).  
203 United States v. Conley, 291 F.3d 464, 472 (7th Cir. 2002).  
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other bad acts evidence:  (1) direct evidence, (2) Rule 404(b)’s “other 
bad acts” evidence, and (3) inextricably intertwined or intricately 
related evidence.204 Evidence of Gorman’s involvement in the 
uncharged conspiracy was admitted as inextricably intertwined 
evidence;205 accordingly, the court should review the evidence in light 
of that doctrine. However, the court did not address whether the 
evidence was properly admitted as inextricably intertwined 
evidence.206 The standard of review is such that if the record reflects 
any rational basis for the district court’s admission of the evidence, the 
district court’s finding will be affirmed.207 “Under an abuse of 
discretion standard of review, as long as the admission was proper, the 
fact that the rationale for admission may have been blurred matters 
little.”208 The court indicated that, “any confusion of the proper 
channel of admissibility is insignificant to that ultimate outcome.”209 
Given that Gorman was charged with perjury based on his denial of 
ever having the Bentley, the court believed that the evidence that he 
actually did have the Bentley was direct evidence of the charged 
crime.210 Therefore, the evidence would have been properly admitted 
as direct evidence; the fact that it was admitted as inextricable 
intertwinement evidence “is insignificant to th[e] ultimate 
outcome.”211 
Although the court did not address whether the evidence of 
Gorman’s involvement in the uncharged conspiracy was inextricably 
intertwined with the charged perjury, the court did address the 
inextricable intertwinement doctrine in great detail. Having “recently 
cast doubt on the continuing viability of the inextricable 
intertwinement doctrine,”212 the court now moved to completely 
                                                 
204 Gorman, 613 F.3d at 717–18. 
205 Id. at 715. 
206 Id. at 717–20.  
207 Id. at 717, 719. 
208 Id. at 719 (citing Conley, 291 F.3d at 472).  
209 Gorman, 613 F.3d at 719. 
210 Id.  
211 Id.  
212 Id. at 718; see also United States v. Conner, 583 F.3d 1011 (7th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Taylor 522 F.3d 731, 734–36 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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abolish the doctrine, believing it to have “outlived its usefulness.”213 
Having earlier surveyed the three bases of admissibility of other bad 
acts evidence, the court discussed the relationship among the three 
doctrines and concluded that there is no further need for the 
inextricably intertwined doctrine.214 Either other bad acts evidence is 
direct evidence, in which case it is always admissible, constrained only 
by Rule 403, or it is propensity evidence, in which case it is 
constrained by Rule 404(b) and Rule 403.215 The court found that 
“almost all evidence admitted under this [inextricable intertwinement] 
doctrine is also admissible under Rule 404(b).”216 For example, in this 
case, had the evidence not been direct evidence, it would have been 
admissible under Rule 404(b) as indicative of motive. As such, “there 
is often no need to spread the fog of inextricably intertwined over 
it.”217 The court found that the inextricable intertwinement doctrine 
has become “overused, vague, and quite unhelpful.”218 Given the 
doctrine’s confusing nature and the court’s belief in its redundancy in 
light of other doctrines, the court concluded that “[h]enceforth, resort 
to inextricable intertwinement is unavailable when determining a 
theory of admissibility.”219 
 
C. Analysis  
 
The Seventh Circuit believed that “almost all evidence admitted 
under [the inextricable intertwinement] doctrine is also admissible 
under Rule 404(b).”220 This means one of two things:  (1) either the 
court is merging the doctrine with Rule 404(b) and in effect, indicating 
its position that Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than one of 
exclusion, or (2) the court is eradicating bases of admissibility 
                                                 
213 Gorman, 613 F.3d at 719.  
214 Id. at 718–19. 
215 Id. at 718. 
216 Id. (quoting Conner, 583 F.3d at 1019).  
217 Gorman, 613 F.3d at 718 (quoting Conner, 583 F.3d at 1019) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
218 Id. at 719.  
219 Id.  
220 Id. at 718 (citing Conner, 583 F.3d at 1019).  
 223
28
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 7
http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/7
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                          Volume 6, Issue 1                            Fall 2010 
 
previously covered by the inextricable intertwinement doctrine, such 
as ‘explains the circumstances’ if there is not a corresponding 
exception under Rule 404(b). Either way, the court has taken important 
and necessary steps to safeguard defendants’ rights. 1. Rule 404(b) as 
Inclusive or Exclusive 
There has been substantial debate regarding whether Rule 
404(b)’s list of exceptions was meant to be exhaustive, and thus 
whether Rule 404(b) was meant to be an inclusive or exclusive rule. 
Many courts view the Rule’s language of “such as” as indicative of 
Congress’s intent that the list be non-exhaustive, i.e., that other bad 
acts evidence be admissible for purposes other than those specifically 
articulated by the Rule.221 Based on this language, courts admit other 
bad acts evidence for purposes not specifically articulated by Rule 
404(b).222  
However, a careful examination of Rule 404(b)’s legislative 
history indicates that this may not have been Congress’ intent, and by 
imputing such an intent, the courts have created a plethora of 
“overused, vague, and quite unhelpful”223 overlapping doctrines of 
admissibility. As originally submitted to Congress, Rule 404(b) read:   
 
                                                 
221 See United States v. Taylor, 522 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing 
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687–89) (“The aim of the rule is simply 
to keep from the jury evidence that the defendant is prone to commit crimes or is 
otherwise a bad person.”); Udemba v. Nicoli, 237 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[W]e 
reject the appellant’s concept that Rule 404(b) contains a comprehensive list of all 
the ways in which evidence of other bad acts may be specially relevant. Although the 
text of that rule enumerates some of the purposes for which such evidence may be 
admitted (e.g., to show ‘motive’ or ‘intent’), that list is not exhaustive.”); United 
States v. Fields, 871 F.2d 188, 196 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[Rule 404(b)’s] list is not 
exhaustive . . . ‘for the range of relevancy outside the ban is almost infinite; and 
further, . . . the purposes are not mutually exclusive for the particular line of proof 
may fall within several of them.’”) (citing CHARLES MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 
at 448 (Cleary ed. 1972)).  
222 See, e.g., United States v. Cruz-Garcia, 344 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(admitting other bad acts evidence to refute defense’s assertions defendant was too 
unsophisticated to have committed charged crime).  
223 Gorman, 613 F.3d at 719.  
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Evidence of other bad acts, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. This subdivision does not exclude the 
evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.224  
 
The House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary amended 
the second sentence of the Rule to read “It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.”225 The House believed that this formulation of the Rule 
placed greater emphasis on admissibility.226 However, this does not 
indicate that the House intended to change the scope of the Rule. 
Placing greater emphasis on admissibility is not the same thing as 
changing the scope of admissibility. Congress simply changed the 
sentence from a negative statement to a positive one, which does not 
necessarily reflect any substantive changes in the statement’s meaning. 
Although there may not be any decisive evidence of Congress’ 
intended scope for Rule 404(b), in effect, the scope of the Rule could 
be precisely what the Seventh Circuit decided in Gorman.227 By re-
directing all evidence previously understood as inextricably 
intertwined to be admitted under Rule 404(b), the court may have 
subtly indicated its position that Rule 404(b) is to be applied as a rule 
of inclusion.228 Admission under Rule 404(b) requires many safety 
precautions for defendants not taken when the inextricable 
intertwinement doctrine is invoked. By viewing the Rule as inclusive, 
the court may be merging the inextricable intertwinement doctrine 
with Rule 404(b); this allows the court to provide necessary protection 
                                                 
224 Fed. Rules of Evidence Notes of Advisory Committee on Rule, Notes to 
Rule 404 (Jan. 2, 1975, P.L. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1932; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Oct. 1, 
1987) (Amended Dec. 1, 1991) (emphasis added).  
225 H.R. REP. NO. 93-650 (1974) (emphasis added).  
226 Id. 
227 See 613 F.3d 711. 
228 See id. at 718–19. 
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to defendants’ rights by subjecting the evidence to the Rule’s 
precautions without the court having to worry that necessary 
prosecutorial evidence will systemically go unadmitted as a result of 
the inextricable intertwinement doctrine’s abolition.   
 
2. Providing More Protection to Defendants 
 
Prior to the court’s ruling in Gorman, by simply labeling evidence 
as “inextricably intertwined,” courts could avoid examining the 
evidence’s applicability of evidence under Rule 404(b). For example, 
to admit other bad acts evidence under Rule 404(b), the Seventh 
Circuit stated that the court must determine if: 
 
(1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in 
issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the 
crime charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act is 
similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the 
matter in issue, (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury 
finding that the defendant committed the similar act, and (4) 
the probative value of the evidence is not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.229 
 
In failing to examine the admissibility of evidence under Rule 
404(b), courts turn a “blind eye to the danger of admitting prejudicial 
[other bad acts] evidence.”230 Evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) 
entails a variety of precautionary steps, such as requiring notice to the 
defendant, requiring the non-propensity purpose to be specifically 
articulated, and requiring a corresponding limiting instruction.231 All 
of these precautions are designed to protect the defendant from what is 
known to be extremely prejudicial evidence.232 Although evidence 
admitted as inextricably intertwined is subject to Rule 403’s balancing 
                                                 
229 United States v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934, 945 (7th Cir. 1990).  
230 Imwinkelried, supra note 56, at 730; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 13–18.  
231 FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note.  
232 See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text.  
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test,233 the evidence is not subject to any other constraints.234 This is 
presumably because evidence historically admitted under this doctrine 
was not offered to prove anything. Inextricably intertwined evidence 
was not meant to be substantively considered; rather, the evidence was 
simply necessary to maintain cohesion in the prosecution’s case.235 
Therefore, precautions ensuring that the evidence would be non-
prejudicial did not develop. To use inextricably intertwined evidence, 
the government does not have to prove that the defendant actually 
committed the other bad acts;236 in contrast, many jurisdictions require 
the government to prove to some standard that the defendant actually 
committed the other bad acts in question.237 Furthermore, neither the 
prosecution nor the judge must specify “why he or she believes that 
the deletion of the references will impair the narrative integrity of the 
prosecution’s account of the charged offense;”238 for example, 
although it may be argued that without the evidence, there will be a 
chronological or conceptual void in the evidence, neither is required to 
identify what that void may be.239 Although some jurisdictions do 
provide a limiting instruction for inextricably intertwined evidence, 
                                                 
233 FED. R. EVID. 403; see also, e.g., United States v. Strong, 485 F.3d 985, 
990–91 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Even inextricably intertwined evidence must withstand 
scrutiny under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which allows a district court to 
exclude relevant evidence if its prejudicial impact substantially outweighs its 
probative value.”).  
234 See United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 763–64 (7th Cir. 2002). “[S]o 
long as those [inextricably intertwined] acts meet the requirements of Rule 403, they 
may be admitted in evidence at trial.” Id. at 764.  
235 See People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1901).   
236 See, e.g., Jennifer Y. Schuster, Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule 404(b): 
The Admissibility of Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 
961, 971–72. “As the courts began to articulate preadmission requirements for Rule 
404(b) evidence, particularly the clear and convincing standard of proof prior to 
admission, the courts were reluctant to subject [inextricably intertwined] evidence to 
these requirements, because to do so would put too great a burden upon the 
government.” Id. at 971.  
237 See generally Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).  
238 Imwinkelried, supra note 56, at 731.  
239 Id. at 741.  
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guiding the jury away from impermissible character inferences,240 
there is a “marked judicial trend” towards not providing such an 
instruction.241 Furthermore, whereas evidence admitted under Rule 
404(b) may be used only to demonstrate the element for which it was 
offered,242 “treating evidence as inextricably intertwined . . . also 
carries the implicit finding that the evidence is admissible for all 
purposes notwithstanding its bearing on character, thus eliminating the 
defense’s entitlement, upon request, to a jury instruction.”243 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
By abolishing the doctrine of inextricable intertwinement as a 
basis for other bad acts evidence in Gorman,244 the Seventh Circuit 
not only afforded desperately needed protections to defendants but 
also eased a substantial burden on the judicial system. As previou
applied, the doctrine threatened defendants’ rights to a fair trial, too 
easily allowing impermissible character evidence to be admitted 
because it was inextricably intertwined with evidence necessary to 
prove the charged crime.
sly 
                                                
245 Therefore, if the court had continued to 
use this doctrine, to adequately protect defendants, it would have been 
necessary to overhaul the doctrine, clearly delineating what evidence 
is and is not admissible under it, as this is currently unclear.246 This 
task has plagued courts for more than 100 years;247 however, even if 
the court found its way through the fog, continuing to use the doctrine 
would require detailed analyses of the facts of each case and a detailed 
construction and evaluation of each parties’ arguments to determine 
exactly what evidence is inextricably intertwined. Not only would this 
further stress an already extremely over-worked judiciary, but it also 
 
240 Id. at 731.  
241 Id. at 742.  
242 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
243 United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
244 613 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2010). 
245 See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.  
246 Id.  
247 See People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1901).   
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interferes with the parties’ rights to construct their case as they so 
choose and potentially affects the court’s impartiality. This area of the 
law is contentious enough, with Rule 404(b) being the most litigated 
Rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence.248 Compounding the 
complexities of this Rule by continuing to have a vague and misused 
doctrine was wasteful of the judiciary’s already scarce time and 
dangerous for defendants. By abolishing the doctrine of inextricable 
intertwinement and having one less basis of admissibility for other bad 
acts evidence, the court has given defendants and the judiciary in 
general so much more.    
 
                                                 
248 MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at 327 n.2. (noting that Rule 404(b) cases were 
as abundant “as the sands of the sea”). 
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